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THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY*
SUPERIOR COURT

oF

BALTIMORE CITY

Filed November 9, 1932.
HELEN GOLDSBOROUGH GRArAm
VS.
THE

POST COMPANY, UNITED ARTISTS TMATRE
THE SUN CAB COMPANY, INC., AND GENERAL
Iac.,
CmCiUT,
TAxIcAB, INc.
BALTIMORE

Suit at law, based on right of privacy.
Use by daily paper, and commercial companies, in an advertisement of the uicture of a woman (a private character), without her
consent, raises question of recognition in the law of "right of privacy,"
against the asserted right of "Freedom of the Press."
Doctrine, in present form, first advanced in 1890. List of legal
articles and adjudicated cases (down to November 1, 1932), examined,
quoted from and criticized.
New York and Rhode Island (leading cases) reject the doctrine.
Georgia, in sweeping decision, fully recognizes it.
Natural law and common law, as sources of human rights, considered.
Right- of privacy, for 200 years, has been protected. Judges ever
groping for "precedent" as a crutch on which to lean, and for "fictions" on which to support their rulings, have often invoked the fiction of "property right," or a "breach of trust" a the basis for Equity
jurisdiction in granting relief, or have found the right based on "contract," with a remedy at law.
The specter of "vexatious litigation" In the background, is no sufficient legal answer as to the existence of such right.
Freedom of the Press considered, and its limitations defined.
Truth as a defense to libel or slander, is not a defense to the invasion of the right of privacy, a right inherent in man, under the laws
of his creation, one recognized in government, under "liberty" and
"personal security" and in a right to the "pursuit of happiness."
The Press and other defendants held liable, in action at law, for
invasion of "right of privacy." Demurrers overruled, and all defendants required to plead.
EUGENE 0'DuNNE, J.-

The declaration in this case charges that on June 28, 1932,
The Baltimore Post Company illegally, unlawfully and wantonly, on its own behalf and as agent, representative and at the
*This decision, which collects the authorities on this question to
date and which presents a good discussion of the problem, is printed
for the information of the profession.
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.solicitation and direction of the United Artists Theatre Circuit,
Inc., and the Sun Cab Company, Inc., and the General Taxicab,
Inc., as defendants, published and distributed and sold in large
quantities to the general public on that day and other days, pictures, photographs, portraits and advertisements of the plaintiff,
without her consent, authority or permission, express or implied,
and for the selfish ptirpose of financial gain, profit and trade,
whereby the privacy and personal security, liberty. and seclusion
of the plaintiff were disturbed, invaded and violated, and the
plaintiff subjected to unwarranted and undesired publicity,
offense, mortification and ridicule, causing great mental suffering, anguish and distress, and otherwise injuring and damaging
her as an additional result and consequence thereof, and that
the plaintiff is not a public character and in no way waived her
right of privacy, claiming $10,000 damages, and praying for a
jury trial.
Demurrer is filed"to the declaration which, for present purposes, admits the facts and challenges any legal liability flowing
therefrom.
On the pleading, therefore, there is a square cut issue as to
whether the doctrine of the right of privacy in such case finds
recognition in the law.
The right of privacy, in the present garb in which it presents itself in the Court, was one with which Courts were unfamiliar prior to 1890. Certain litigation, instituted in New
York about that time, and later, the joint article in December,
1890, of Brandeis and Warren, attracted some special attention,
because of the supposed novelty of the doctrine. Now, in 1932,
there seems to be a most active revival of interest in its application to modern society. This interest has become intensified
possibly because of the flagrant abuses of it by the tabloid and
other Press, and their bold assertion of a right so to do under
the constitutional guarantees of "Freedom of the Press." When
abuse of human rights and discussion of legal doctrines awaken
popidarinterest, and find their way into serious discussion in the
higher class periodicals, it is time for Courts to stop, look and
listen, and ascertain what it is all about.
"Paul Pry and Privacy," in the October Atlantic Monthly,
by Mitchell Dawson, of Chicago, is a substantial legal dose,
sugar-coated for lay consumption. Legal discussions, when
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popular put, are as interesting as any fiction. Dawson has ably
succeeded in his presentation. Another learned article which
must have required much research and labor appears on the right
of privacy by Leon Green in tbhe November, 1932, Illinois Law
Journal (Northwestern Universtiy, Volume 27); and still another in Boston University Law Review, by Basil Kacedan, June
Number, 1932, Volume 12.
Other legal periodicals and adjudications, with discussion
of both the principle and the instance in which it has been
applied, or denied, are:
Right of Privacy.
List of Authorities (as of Nov. 1, 1932).
Articles:
Brandeis and Warren on the "Right of Privacy" In "Selected Essays on the Law of Torts," published by the Cambridge Press in 1924.
The article also appears in 4 Harvard Law Review page 193. Written
on Dec. 15, 1890.
Leon Green (Dean of the Law School of Northwestern University)
on the "Right of Privacy," in 27 Ill. Law Review, 237, November, 1932.
Discusses interests in personality which includes the following phases:
Physical integrity; feelings or emotions; capacity for activity or service; name; likeness, history and privacy.
Basil Kacedan on the "Right of Privacy" in 12 Boston University
Law Review, 353, June, 1932.
"The Right of Privacy Today," 43 Harvard Law Review, 297, De-

cember, 1929.

"True Statement of the Violation of Right of Privacy," 62 Am. L.
Rev. 926 (1928).
"The Right of Privacy Today," 17 Ky. L. J., 85, January, 1929; and
19 Ky. L. J. 101, January, 1931.
"The Right of Privacy," 4 Temple Law Quarterly, 373, August,
1930.
"Recent Developments in Right of Privacy," 14 St. Louis L. R.
306, April, 1929.
Percy H. Winfield on Privacy in 47 Law Quarterly Review, 23
(1931).
William Laremore on the Law of Privacy in 12 Columbia Law
Rev. 693 (1912).
"The Comparative Law of the Right to Privacy," 47 Law Quarterly
Review, 203, 219 (1931).
The law of Germany and Switzerland-H. C. Gutteridge, Id. p. 203.
The French law as to the right of privacy-F. P. Walton, Id. p. 219.
"Paul Pry and Privacy," Mitchell Dawson, October Atlantic
Monthly, 1932.
Annotations:
Privacy, 21 R. C. L. 1196.
The law of the right of privacy, 31 L. R. A. 283.
Right of action for use of photo or name for advertising purposes,
24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 991; 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1137; L. R. A. 1915 C. 839;
L. R. A. 1918 D 1152; 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 386.
American Digest System, Title "Torts," Key Number 8.
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Cases Recognizing the Right of Privacy
District of Columbia-Reed v. Washington Times (1927), 55
Wash. Law Rep. 182.
Georgia-(Leading case) Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co.
(1905). 122 Ga. 190, 50 S. E. 68; Byfield v. Candler (1924), 160 Ga.
732, 125 S. E. 905.
Kansas-Kunz v. Allen (1918), 102 Kan. 883, 172 Pac. 532.
Kentucky-Foster-Milburn Co. v. Chinn (1910), 134 Ky. 424, 120
S. W. 364; Douglas v. Stokes (1912), 149 Ky. 506, 149 S. W. 849; Brent
v. Morgan (1927), 221 Ky. 765, 299 S. W. 967; Rhodes v. Graham
(1931), 238 Ky. 225, 37 S. W. (2d) 46.
Louisiana-Itzkovich v. Whitaker (1905), 115 La. 479, 39 So. 499.
Missouri-Munden v. Harris (1911), 153 Mo. A. 652, 134 S. W.
1076.
Cases Denying the Right of Privacy:
Michigan-Atkinson v. Doherty (1899), 121 Mich. 372, 80 N. W.
285. (But see another earlier case not referred to (1831) De May v.
Roberts, 46 Mich. 160, recognizing right of privacy (but not a news-

paper case.)
New York-(Leading case) Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box
Co. (1902), 171 N. Y. 540, 64 N. E. 444.
Rhode Island-(Leading case) Henry v. Cherry (1909), 30 R. L
13, 73, Atl. 97.
Washington-Hillman v. Starr Publishing Co. (1911), 64 Wash.
691, 50 S. E. 68.

I have read all the foregoing articles and examined all the
cases cited (but not all the cases cited in the notes thereto).
For present purposes, three of them may be selected as the

leading cases in which the greatest wealth or argument is presented on each side. The two denying the right of privacy, are
the case in 171 N. Y., a four to three decision, opinion by Alton
B. Parker, J. C. (Justice Gray and two associates vigorously
dissenting.)
In that case 25,000 photographs of a beautiful

young girl were used on flour barrels, to sell such merchandise.
Under her classic features were the words "The Flour of the
Family." The picture was used commercially, without her consent or authority, and with.out profit to her, but to her detriment
and mortification. Relief was denied her, the Court holding,
that in the absence of legislative action, no such right as the
right of privacy exists. This decision was rendered nugatory at
the first meeting of the Legislature which penalized such use for
commercial purpose.
The next most important case, also denying such right, and
on the same grounds (absence of legislation) was the case of
Henry v. Cherry (1909) 30 R. I. 13.
In 1905 came the celebrated case of Pavesich v. New England
Life In. Co., 122 Ga. 190. Following the line of the N. Y. dissent, Judge Cobb wrote a most vigorous opinion, sustaining the
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right, basing it on personal liberty, and the right of the pursuit
of happiness, finding ample authority in the flexibility of the
common law. In that case, the insurance company, without permission or authority, used the photograph of an artist who did
not choose to run as an advertising medium for an insurance
company, even if an ex-President saw fit to become an officer of
one. The right of privacy was sweepingly vindicated by the
Court
The case of Reed v. Washington Times (1927) 55 Wash.
Law Rep. 182, was opinion by IVfr. Justice Siddons (now dead),
and who sat in some of the famous, or infamous, oil cases, and
in the case in which "jury shadowing" was raised to a fine art
at the hand of a master detective. It probably goes further
than any reported case of which I am aware. There was no element of commercialism involved in that case, except in so far as
the publication resulted in increased circulation of the paper.
It was a news account, accompanied by unauthorized use of a
photograph of the female plaintiff (photograph alleged to have
been stolen-not stated by whom). She was a married woman,
visiting a male acquaintance-claimed to be a proper and customary visit. She was asphyxiated in his apartment, likewise
himself, by gas, all to prevalent on "Capital Hill," where the
apartment was located. Th.ey were taken to the hospital, unconscious. There, the prying eyes of the Press, learned her
identity which she has thus far been able to conceal. They published the story, with her photograph. She sued the paper. On
deimurrer, Justice Siddons held that the Press had invaded her
right of privacy, and that the declaration stated a good cause of
action. (Off the record, I have heard that the case was subsequently settled, and never came to trial.)
In a note appearing in 4 Temple Law Quarterly (1929-30)
page 373, at page 375, on the subject of the right of privacy,
reference is made to the unreported case of Manola v. Stevens,
filed June 15th, 1890. It may be noted here in passing that this
suit was six months prior to the joint article of Brandies and
Warren, published in 4 Harvard Law Review, December 15,
1890, and they make reference to said case, and to the further
fact that she appeared in "tights," and that the defendant
Stephens was manager of the play called "Castle in the Air."
Said case was an application for an injunction in the
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Supreme Court of New York by the complainant, an actress,
playing at the Broadway Theatre, who claimed that a flashlight
photograph of her was surreptitiously taken by somebody in one
of the boxes and without her consent, and she prayed injunction
to restrain the exhibition of the photograph. The injunction was
granted, ex parte, and later made permanent, the defendant
offering no defense.
Said legal note in the above publication signed "J. E. G.,"
on page 375 contains also the following paragraph:
"It is conceded that prior to 1890, every adjudicated case, both in
this country and in England, which might be said to have evolved the

right of Privacy, was not based upon the existence of such right, but

was founded upon a supposed right of property, or a breach of trust,
or the like. That a claim to a right of privacy, independent of a property right or contractual right, or some right of a similar nature, up
to that time had never been recognized in terms in any decision, is
clear."

To some juristic minds, philosophically inclined, there are
two sources into which Court may dip for the purpose of finding authority to sustain legal judgments, where right and justice seem to require relief, by the invocation of some legal principles under which essential justice can be dispensed, without
causing the sense of justice of the judicial branch of government
to be abashed by any seeming inability to grant relief. One is
that vast reserve denominated the natural law. This, however,
is not as popular a source from which to make judicial drafts,
as the common law. The latter, by fiction or otherwise, is supposed to be sufficiently bounteous and elastic to meet the ends
of justice under any conditions which might arise, in the progress of government, with its complexities occasioned by the advance of modern civilization. Most judges, in drawing on the
treasure house of legal wisdom, accredit their draft to the common law.
Dean Pound, in his Interpretations of Legal History, page
233, says:
"Natural law, the great agency of juristic development of law, is
a fiction of a superior body of legal principles, existing in reason, of
which the actual body is but an imperfect reflection and by which,
therefore, the actual law may be corrected and supplemented. The
theory is an expression of the jurisconsult's desire to improve and to
add to the existing legal materials, in order to achieve definite ends in
litigation, without impairing confidence in the law as of unchallengeable authority and in such a way as to Persuade tribunals to acceptl
his results."
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High sounding, loose thinking, arguments are made by
eminent jurists in support of what they want to do, in predicating it upon natural law, or "natural justice." Unfortunately,
there is much "natural justice" that is not law. It may be to the
reproach of the law that such is the case, but that of itself does
not alter the fact. We know from history that at one time, it
was established law, and part of our English legal system, to
deny to a prisoner, not only the right to have counsel in his defense, but even the right to testify, though he might be the only
witness in a murder case who had actual knowledge of the facts.
Alen went to the gallows, with all the sancity of British law, who
were denied the right to be confronted with the witness deposing
against them. False confessions of guilt were often wrung from
them by torture, and even in the present time, by third degree
performances. Verdicts of juries were coerced by arbitrary
judges, in conformity with the judicial determination of guilt.
Juries were fined, and even now occasionally discharged and rebuked, for going contrary to the judicial conception of what the
verdict should have been. These wrongs in the law have been
abolished, by constitutional and legislative enactments. Today
it is not wholly proper for a judge to merely close his eyes and
meditate on conceptions of natural justice, but the judicial inquiry must be as to natural justice in so far as it is recognized
and established by law. This, unfortunately, is often quite a
different thing. (See discussion in 47 Law Quarterly, page 203.)
Many of the conclusions reached by high Courts, are due
to a faihre to appreciate and apply the flexibility of the common
law, which is a treasure house of natural justice to supply legal
remedy for most of the real grievances of modern man. Judges
are ever looking for the adjudication of "precedent," as a cane
on which to lean, evincing too great timidity to boldly walk in
the open and see and apply the beauties of natural justice to be
found in all the crevices and recesses of the common law.
Except for the present wealth of precedent, if the question
were now a new one, might not Courts, with equal propriety,
shrink from the far-reaching consequences of the application of
the "law of nuisance," to modern life? Might not the specter
of "vexatious litigation" deter them from the recognition of
this doctrine, because of the myriads of cases to which it might
be applicable. Noises from modern "loud speakers," and the
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possibility of conflicts between freedom of speech and the right
to talk, in his pursuit of happiness, and the right to sleep,
claimed by another, also in the pursuit of both health and happiness. Cannot both rights of freedom and personal security in
the individual, be recognzied, and the Court be relied upon to
make reasonable decision in conflicts, in determining the limits
of reciprocal enjoyments of the right by each ?
What may be right and proper at one time and place, may
be wholly inapplicable under varying conditions. Those of our
Bench and Bar who heard the noted Scotch Jurist, Lord Craigmyle of Craigmyle, in his second manhood at 82, formerly a
Lord of Appeal and a present member of the Privy Council, in
his talk at the Bar Association luncheon on Thursday, November
3rd, 1932, must have beeA. tremendously impressed with his description of the work of the Law Lords, a Court not bound by
precedents, but free to close its eyes to everything except its conception of what he termed the "square deal." He told us how
they apply to Scotland the law suitable to the needs of Scotland,
to Africa, laws suitable to its population, and to India, law and
customs of India. Hundreds of millions would suffer injustice
if they applied to India laws only fit for Scotland. We are without that diversity of people (excluding some of our insular possessions) and without a Court of the character of Law Lords of
Appeal, but, in the diversity of claims asserted under the right
of privacy, Courts may well select from the multiplicity of instances under which it might be presented such concrete cases
of violated personal rights, as seem to present practical instances
of substantial injury, wantonly inflicted, and which cry out for
relief against a wrongdoer. Courts may limit law, in its activity,
to those cases of unquestioned invasion of right that seem meritorious in nature, viewing the matter in its common sense and
practical aspect. The common law always boasted of common
sense in its operation and application.
In the arguments before me last Friday as to this right of
privacy, we were constantly met with the inquiry, "if once
recognized, where is this right to stop?" If it applies to invasion for commercial purposes, why not to invasion for private
curiosity, non-commercial in character? If applicable to the
published photograph of the living, why not to published written
description, or to the spoken word, not covered by the law of
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slander? The admonishing finger in argument was ever pointed
to the ominous shadow of vexatious litigation that lurks in the
background of this picture. To this argument, several answers
may be made: (1) Possibility of increased litigation, is no sufficent answer to a claim of asserted right. The danger from
such increased volume of litigation has sown in it the seeds of its
own destruction,, the liability for costs of the frivolous and
vexatious litigant. (2) That the common sense of Courts can
be reasonably depended upon to winnow the grain at the mill
and separate the chaff. (3) That the same act that might well
be a violation of the right of privacy, as applied to a woman,
might be dismissed, with legal indifference, as applied to a man.
Matters may depend upon race, creed, social standing, and other
incidentals which may give special color to the act complained of
A debutante's picture, published without her authority in the
social section of a respectable Sunday supplement, or in certain
magazines, in connection with the doings of her set at Palm
Beach, Newport or elsewhere; might be unauthorized, but at the
same time be unobjectionable when weighed by accepted standards of propriety. The same picture, published without
authority, in some street corner garbage can, such as Baltimore
"Brevities," among its lewdness and filth, might be highly objectionable, intensely mortifying, and seriously damaging. Again,
printed disclosure of the long since past and buried life and indiscretion of some oth.erwise exemplary woman, (seeking a quiet
life of seclusion), might well be actionable, where the disclosure
was to gratify no public purpose, but merely to increase press
circulation, by pandering to the maudlin curiosity and insatiate
appetite of growing debased public taste. (For further discussion of kindred subjects, see Article of H. C. Gutteridge, 47 Law
Quarterly (1931), page 203, "Comparative Law of Privacy,
Germany and Switzerland.")
Those who dote on precedent, may find more gratification in
an illustration from the high court of India, where a certain
right of privacy, as applied to a particular people, in a given
locality, was peculiar to women of a certain caste, race and
creed, and would not have been applicable, if invoked in London.
Goka$ Prasadv. Roho (1888) India Law Rep. 10 Allahabad,
358. Defendant built his house in such fashion that his veranda
and doors and windows interfered with the privacy of the house
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of the plaintiff, which house was occupied by the females of his
family, who were parada-nashin women. Under Hindu custom
(except of lower caste), the women themselves as well as their
male relations, consider it a disgrace if ber face be exposed to
view of male strangers. In the garden of the plaintiff's property, (before the erection of the objectionable window and
veranda), the women of his family could be unveiled without
being so disgraced (by being seen). That court found no difficulty in protecting that right of privacy from such invasion.
Numerous cases were cited in argument here, some recent
and some more ancient, growing out of greatly diversified situations. In them the relief granted was predicated on different
grounds. Some on the basis of proprty right, some on breach
of trust, protected in Equity, and some as founded on contract,
and enforcible at law.
In four States, the decision is put squarely on recognition
of the right of privacy. The other four States rejected this
specific right. Those definitely recognizing or rejecting the specific right of privacy have already been indicated.
Michigan, 1899, in Atkinson v. Doherty & Co. 121 Mich. 372,
denied relief against name and picture of deceased on brand of
cigar. Was the decision there because the individual was dead,
and the right of privacy died with him, or because the right does
not exist, and would not be recognized in the living? Strange
to say, that Court in that opinion, overlooked, or mentally distinguished, or at least made no mention of its earlier decision
in 1881, in 46 Mich. page 160 (De May v. Roberts), where a
woman's right of personal privacy was expressly and emphatically recognized, against a physician who attended her in childbirth, and who took with him, under guise of assistant, a young
man not even a medical student. Courts feeling so helpless as to
need the fiction of 'property right," as a cane to support them,
could find a substantial crutch in the fact tlat invasion was of
her home, and they could call it a "trespass to real estate," if
they felt compelled to close their eyes to the actual facts, in groping after fictions. They did say something to the effect that the
deceit with which the act was done, overcame her apparent consent to his presence, given in tbhe belief he was a medical attendant, or nurse, necessary to the work of the doctor. Stripped of
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all fiction, it was the invasion of her right of personal privacy
that the law redressed.
The other States rejecting the doctrine are New York, in
1902. The leading case of "Flour of tbhe Family," with opinion
by Parker, C. J., Robertson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., et al.,
171 N. Y. 538. Of interest in connection with that case is the
fact that it was 12 years in litigation, from 1890 to .1902. The
right of privacy was recognized by a unanimous court in the
first instance. Unanimously affirmed on appeal to the New York
Supreme Court, Appellate Division. On appeal to the Court of
last resort, the court of seven, divided three to three, with
Parker, C. J., casting the deciding vote, and writing the opinion
denying the right. Gray, J. and Associates vigorously dissented.
So that even some of the New York Judges, even in its highest
Court and all of the Judges in the lesser Courts, found no difficulty in finding authority under the common law to protect the
rights of this female plaintiff who had been so wantonly abused,
and so grossly and vulgarly commercialized by the unscrupulous.
Rhode Island followed in 1909 in a long and learned opinion
denying the right in the case of Henry v. Cherry, 24 L. R. A.
(N. S.) page 991, 73 Atl. 97, 30 R. I. 13.
A late and interesting case, one not involving "freedom of
the press," but one recognizing and vindicating the right of
privacy, is (1931) Rhodes v. Graham, et al., 238 Ky. 225.
Syllabus:
"1. Torts.-Unwarranted invasion of 'right of privacy' constitutes
'legal injuria' for which redress will be granted.
"'Right of privacy' has been defined as right to live one's life In
seclusion, without being subjected to unwarranted and undesired publicity, or right to be let alone.
"2. Torts.-Petition to recover damages for invasion of right and
privacy by tapping telephone wires running into plaintiff's home
stated cause of action."

(This was not a prohibition case of wire tapping, but a private neighbor with an over developed sense of curiosity and under
developed sense of decency.)
At page 228-9 the Court in its opinion said:
"The evil incident to the invasion of the privacy of the telephone
is as great as that occasioned by unwarranted publicity in newspapers
and by other means of a man's private affairs for which courts have
granted the injured person redress. Whenever a telephone line is
tapped the privacy of those talking over the line is invaded and conversations, wholly proper and confidential, may be overheard. Wire
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tapping is akin to eavesdropping, which was an indictable offense at
common law, and while it has not been made a punishable offense by
statute in this state, we conclude that the facts alleged in the petition
in this case constitute a wrong done to appellant for which the law
affords a remedy by an action for damages.
"Wherefore the judgment is reversed, with directions to overrule
the demurrer to the petition as amended.
"The whole court sitting."

Whether a photo of one's self is "property" in his physiogomy, or within what may be described as "individual liberty,"
is a mere matter of scientific legal classification or terminology.
A man has a right to chose his profession in life, and to seek to
become a public character, or he may choose to remain a private
citizen, not merely of the garden, but of the recluse, variety.
What right has the public press to make him take a nude sun
bath, before the public in its daily press run? In the book "Only
Yesterday" we are reminded of the time when the style was for
women to wear veils-some widows still do, for a time at least.
May not a woman, choosing to withdraw to seclusion, withhold
her countenance from public gaze, even on the street? Has the
press any more right to force her face on the front page, than a
photographer would have to lift her veil on the street and take
hIer photograph? Is the answer to be found in the legal dis.
covery that in the latter case it would be a technical trespass or
assault, merely because that fiction is recognized in law. The
former would likewise be a trespass on her right of privacy.
There is an interesting French case (I have not the reference
to where reported, but mentioned in Walton's note on French
law of Privacy, 47 Qr. Rev. 219), where a noted surgeon had
himself photographed in the various stages of a delicate operation. He wanted the pictures to illustrate teenique in his lectures to his medical students. A photographer had movies made
of it, and undertook to exhibit them, much to the mortification
of the French physician who was embarrassed by the implication that he was unethically advertising himself. The Courts
granted relief on the ground that he had "property" interest
in the photographs, and on the theory of "breach of trust" warranting restraint. It might have been put more apropriately
on the straightforward ground of the right of privacy.
With about an equal number of States and decisions deny.
ing the right, with those recognizing it and granting relief, I
think it may be fairly said, from the quite numerous articles in
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the periodical legal literature of the day, that the trend of decisions and public sentiment is in the direction of the recognition of the right of privacy, in reasonable and proper cases, and
with recognized limitation not easily defined.
Examination of the cases leads me to the conclusion that for
some 200 or more years relief has been given against certain invasions of one's right of privacy. It is matter of small moment
that the juristic mind, cautious and conservative, ever groping
for precedent in granting relief, based its reason on some then
recognized legal ground, no matter how far-fetcled the fiction
might be on which it was supported. Hence cases may be
grouped into those which found in it some property right, to
support equity jurisdiction, for restraint against its invasion.
Others bolstered up their jurisdiction on the fiction of "breach
of trust" (often present as an incident -of the invasion of the
right of privacy). Still others were able to grant relief at law
under fact, or fiction, of "breach of contract." Stripped of all
legal fiction, it was essentially right of privacy which was being
protected. Called by any other name, it proved just as sacred.
Why the necessity for so much artifice ? The New York dissent
of Justice Gray and others, adopted and followed by the leading
case in Georgia (Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga.
190), have at last unmasked the judicial batteries, and have
made the fight in the open, under the banner of right of privacy,
as inherent in "personal liberty" and personal "security" and
the "pursuit of happiness," in no wise inconsistent with the
"freedom of speech" or "Freedom of the Press."
It is not necessary for the purpose of this decision to attempt to answer all of the subtle questions so ingeniously put
by the learned counsel for the defendants, as to where the logic
of the recognition of the right of privacy ultimately may lead?
Nor is it necessary for the purpose of this decision for the Court
to indicate what its views would be as to the possible application of the right of privacy to some of the instances of life
which well might arise, and which confessedly would be borderline cases in the twilight zone.
The instant case, on the allegations set forth in the declaration, presents no legal difficulty, as I see it. It is simply a bold
and bald attempt to take, withbput consent obtained, the photograph of the female plaintiff (a private citizen, not subject to
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the limelight of a public character) and to capitalize her features
as an advertising medium for gain and profit by theatre and
taxicab companies, who are using The Baltimore Post, a daily
evening publication in Baltimore, as the medium of reaching a
large reading public through paid advertisement inserted in its
columns, and to the profit of -aid defendant paper, in the proceeds of said advertising campaign.
The doctrine of freedom of the press simply recognizes the
principles of free speech in printed form, and permits the press
to publish what it will, subject to liability for its abuse of said
freedom. This liability is not limited to responding to either
the civil or criminal law of libel. Truth of the matter published
in this State being a defense to civil and criminal prosecutions
for libel, but is not a defense to the abuse of the right of freedom
of the press which invades the right of personal privacy, to
which the plaintiff, on the allegations of this declaration is undoubtedly entitled.
Wherefore, the demurrers of all four defendants to the
declaration are each overruled, and each defendant required to
further plead to said declaration within ten days.
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